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Explanatory approachStrategic alliances are well-established organizational forms and a means of strategy implementation. Despite
their growing pervasiveness in the economy, existent literature provides few insights about earnings quality of
strategic alliances. This challenge is especially severe in contractual alliances (CAs), where firms do not form a
new corporate entity that is separate from the parent organization in comparison to joint ventures (JVs). We
investigate how earnings attributes differ depending on involvement in strategic alliances of 8137 CAs and
3026 JVs spanning 1997–2007. We find, in particular, that earnings attributes of firms involved in contractual
alliances are broadly reflective of low underlying accounting quality. Relative to JV firms and non-alliance (NA)
firms, they have higher levels of discretionary accruals, lower accrual quality, and earnings that are less persis-
tent, less smooth, less relevant, less timely, and less conservative. They also have lower earnings response
coefficients.
© 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Strategic alliances are voluntarily initiated cooperative agreements
between firms that involve exchanging, sharing or co-developing
resources or firm-specific assets (Li, Qian, & Qian, 2013). Firms enter
strategic alliances to minimize costs that stem from coordination diffi-
culties, to access other parties' resources, to acquire institutional knowl-
edge, and to retain and develop own resources by combining themwith
those of partners' (Chan, Kensinger, Keown, & Martin, 1997).
In this study, we tackle the broad question of how firms' earnings
quality differs depending on their involvement in strategic alliances.
Despite growing pervasiveness of strategic alliances the existent litera-
ture provides few insights about the impact of strategic alliances on
firms' earnings. This impact is particularly important for firms' strategy
since firms' earnings is a significant indicator of firm performance. In
particular, alliances often involve an ongoing intermingling of the oper-
ations, such as of reporting behaviors, of two or more “independent”
entities. Hence, the economic performance of one involved entity nowir invaluable suggestions. They
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ghts reserved.depends partly on the well-being of its partner(s). Moreover, while the
overall alliance constitutes an arms-length agreement, the structuring
of individual transactions and allocations within it may involve various
informal quid-pro-quo arrangements among the partners. These
tradeoffs have substantive implications for periodic financial accounting
reports. In such cases, strategic alliance arrangements may blanket vari-
ous opportunistic and short-run earnings management activities.
Using earnings qualitymetrics established in the literature (Velury &
Jenkins, 2006) we explore the earnings quality of (1) firms involved
in joint venture alliances (JV), and (2) firms involved in contractual alli-
ances (CA). Specifically, we evaluate whether earnings attributes differ
betweenfirmswith joint ventures (JV-firms) andfirmswith contractual
alliances (CA-firms), as well as between such alliance firms and firms
without any recent alliance activity (i.e., non-alliance or NA-firms).
Our findings broadly support that firms involved in CA earnings exhibit
inferior attributes relative to either JVs orNAs.However, JVs andNAs are
indistinguishable for most of the earnings quality attributes examined.
Although managers of CA-firms provide more quantitative and qualita-
tive voluntary earnings reports, i.e. voluntary disclosure, than that of all
other firms including JV-firms and NA-firms to decrease the premium
that investors demand because of poorer information quality environ-
ment, when the alliance is not formalized and largely unreported,
there is still an evidence of a substantive relative impairment in earnings
quality.
2. Literature review
Strategic alliances accomplish preset objectives such as increasing
efficiency and creating competitive advantages while avoiding both
market uncertainties and hierarchical rigidities. Strategic alliances may
be formalized as JVs in which the joint activities are compartmentalized
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defined and intertwined, a state we identify as CAs. Partner firms share
benefits andmanagerial control over the performance of assigned tasks,
and make continuing contributions to one or more strategic areas, such
as technology or product development. Partner firms in a strategic
alliance remain legally independent after the alliance is formed
(Yoshino & Rangan, 1995). Chan et al. (1997) observe that CA-firms
do not share equity controls, but they fulfill their responsibilities and
contribute to the partnershipwith their resources, such as high technol-
ogy, products and/or skills, product design, delivery schedules, prices
and other terms. Moreover, CAs do not prepare financial reports or file
tax returns individually. Thus, in most cases any detail related to the
individual activities of contractual alliances is not available for external
users or the public.
Anand and Khanna (2000) recognize alliances as complex organiza-
tional typeswith incomplete contracts that are open to all kinds of infor-
mational noise, and managerial discretions. Alliance setting is a fertile
environment for opportunistic managers and directors to exercise
their personal interests through their accounting choices. Two control
problems arise with firms involved in alliances: (1) the management
of appropriation concerns that result from partner firm's opportunistic
behaviors, and (2) the coordination of tasks by building on transaction
cost economics and organizational theory.
Evidence on market reaction to the formation of either CA or JV is
limited. Das, Sen, and Sengupta (1998) documented that, on average,
abnormal returns are positive and statistically significant when there
is a strategic alliance announcement. By partitioning the sample into
marketing and technological alliances, they found that overall positive
abnormal returns are attributable to technological alliances. Chan et al.
(1997) documented positive price reaction to the formation of CA
without evidence of wealth transfer. McConnell and Nantell (1985),
Koh and Venkatraman (1991) and Woolridge and Snow (1990) found
abnormal positive returns around the time that the JV agreements
were announced.
3. Research issues
In many cases, the economic performance of strategic alliances is
difficult to discern from the involved firm.While this coupling is formal
in JVs, it may impair the quality of their financial reporting. This is espe-
cially so in CAs where the intertwining is informal, because joint activi-
ties are not compartmentalized. These reporting techniques may create
allocation problems when each partner needs to report their financial
transactions individually.
Separating financial activities of the partner firm's entities from
those of the strategic alliances has been an ongoing challenge for
accounting practitioners both in terms of financial and tax reporting is-
sues (Wallman, 1995). There is also no standard reporting requirement
regarding the strategic alliance activities of firms (Healy & Palepu,
2001). Hence, we examine the relationship between earnings quality
and either JV or CA involvement. Our explanatory study provides
insights into whether such arrangements are generally benign, with
no substantive externally observable financial reporting implications;
or consistent, with alliance driven reporting consequences that affect
the quality of externally reported financial information.
3.1. Financial reporting aspects of strategic alliances
In most cases, the economic performance of a firm involved in
strategic alliances is coupled with its alliance partners. For example, it
is difficult for financial statements to fully reflect the exclusive contracts
that underlie strategic alliance relations between Steve Madden and its
manufacturers. Because of its alliances, Steve Madden has been able to
outsource the low margin activities for its business. However, the
reported financial performance of Steve Madden does not fully reflect
the complex relationship and implicit commitments between thecompanies. Therefore, distortions to any of the accounting numbers
and allocations related to contractual alliances and joint ventures may
create inherent problems and noise in the financial statements of the
partnering firms. Especially in CAs where, activities of the allied firms
are completely intermingled, such economic activities by each firm
must be separated for individual financial reporting. This separation
process, even if conducted in “good faith”, could lead to substantial
distortions in the financial reports of allied firms. This would make it
difficult for the preparers and users of financial reports to distinguish
the individual activities of allied firms accurately. For example, CAs
and allied firms often share common resources such as information
technology, legal services, human resource management and executive
time. Commoncost allocation of these resources is difficultwhen under-
taken as an explicit exercise (Ray, 2007). In less formal CA settings com-
mon costs may entirely escape from explicit accounting attention and
may simply fall out of the affiliated company's financial statements. In
a similar fashion, consolidating JV financials with those of the parent
firms may also create accounting problems when the JV and its parent
firms use different accounting methods.
The fundamental conflict posed by strategic alliances concerns the
viability of treating them as independent entities. The very nature of a
strategic alliance implies mutual dependence. In CAs, the issue is
compounded by the fact that, unlike JVs, the alliance is not a compart-
mentalized organization with its own separate accounting system.
That is, CAs rely on the allied firms' accounting systems, therefore the
financial information/performance of CAs is non-systematically and
non-observably aggregated into the parent firm financial reports. Alter-
natively, JVs generate separate financial reports based on a JV-specific
accounting system for their partners and interested parties. Therefore,
this joint activity is observable and transparent in the case of JVs.
Moreover, income impacts are allocated to partners based on the JV
agreement making them observable to external parties. Hence, while
interdependence characterizes both forms of strategic alliances they
differ markedly in terms of the underlying accounting mechanics.
Unlike JVs, where parent firms establish a separate organizational
unit with established accounting and controlling systems, in CAs there
are no such regulatory requirements (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Absence
of such a mandated disclosure may contribute more to the noisiness
of the reporting of CAs. However, from a market-based point of view
(Core and Guay, 2001), firms may need to respond to investors' infor-
mation demand when accounting data is less useful in assessing firm
value and informing the market. In order to do so, CA-firms provide
more remedial quantitative and qualitative data in the formof voluntary
disclosures than JV-firms and NA-firms such as non-financial discus-
sions in their reporting. This finding may be due to a response to inves-
tors' information demand when accounting data is less useful in
assessing firm value accurately. In other words, although not required
legally, especially we observe more voluntary disclosure of qualitative
information in CAs. Such a remedy targeted towards increasing the
accounting based reporting quality may eventually decrease noise in
accounting reporting of CA-firms. Table 1 provides some useful insights
about the financial reporting attributes of JVs and CAs.
JV-firms commonly provide joint activity information in both the
Management Discussion and Analysis and the financial reporting sec-
tions of their annual reports. In some cases, they also provide complete
financial statements showing how each transaction affects the main
business activities of the parentfirms. CA-firms generally donot provide
quantitative financial information about their partnership activities.
However, they tend to provide information regarding the strategic in-
fluence of the alliance on the firm, and the purpose behind establishing
CAs.
Panel A of Table 1 is based on our examination of firm financial re-
ports (i.e., annual reports and 10Ks) of 100 randomly selected JV-firms
and CA-firms. This table provides a breakdown of the fundamental
joint activity(ies) encompassed by the strategic alliance for JV and CA
samples. For JV-firms revenue sharing (43 firms), operating cost sharing
Table 1
Content analysis of joint venture and contractual alliance financial reports (Year 1997–2007).
Panel A: nature of joint activity (n = 100)
Type Joint ventures Contractual alliances
Activity type
Revenue sharing including customer listings 43 reports 34 reports
Operating cost sharing 31 42
Technology/patent/trademark sharing 23 17
Research/product development sharing 27 39
Distribution channels/market sharing 24 32
Strategic motivation
Resource sharing 56 43
Risk sharing 48 52
Legal responsibilities sharing 23 19
Other 8 6
Panel B: annual report/10K content (n = 100)
Number of reports containing specified type of
information in quantitative form
Numbers of reports containing specified type of
information in qualitative form
Joint ventures Contractual alliances Joint ventures Contractual alliances
Financial disclosures
Income 92 19 65 19
Revenues 75 17 58 14
Costs/expenses 75 53 15 8
Investment 57 48 35 39
Transactions 46 37 4 3
None 8 65 8 52
Non-financial discussions
Partner(s) identified N/A N/A 82 73
Nature of venture N/A N/A 86 68
Strategic aspects N/A N/A 79 56
None found 5 12
1808 S. Demirkan, I. Demirkan / Journal of Business Research 67 (2014) 1806–1816(31 firms), and research/product development sharing (27 firms) are
the most commonly identified joint activities. For CA-firms these same
activities also constitute the threemost common joint activities, but op-
erating cost (42 firms) and research/product development (39 firms)
sharing are found in more firms while revenue sharing is found in
fewer firms (34 firms). Resource sharing is the most common strategic
motivation for JV firms (56 firms) followed by risk sharing (48 firms).
These numbers are similar for CA-firms (43 and 52 firms respectively).
Overall, evidence in Panel A suggests that JV-firms and CA-firms encom-
pass similar sorts of activities and strategic motivations.
Panel B of Table 1 reports the frequencies with which JV-firms and
CA-firms financial reports provide quantitative or qualitative informa-
tion about joint incomes, revenues, costs, investment, and other trans-
actions. What stands out in this panel is the fewer reporting of alliance
related quantitative and qualitative information for CAs relative to JVs.
Almost all (92) of the JV firm financial reports provide some form of
quantitative disclosure about the alliance activity. In contrast, most
(65) of the CA-firm reports provide no quantitative information about
the alliance and, in fact, more than half (52) are also not providing qual-
itative information about its financial aspects. In terms of specific types
of financial information, 92 out of the 100 JV-firms report income
numbers for the venture. In comparison, only 19 out of the 100 CA-
firms report such income numbers. Similar divergences arise with re-
spect to revenues (75 vs. 17), costs (82 vs. 15), and specific transactions
(46 vs. 4) for JVs vs. CAs. Overall, financial reports appear to be far more
revealing of JV activities than they are of CA activities.
3.2. Monitoring and opportunism in strategic alliances
The interdependent nature of strategic alliances influences manage-
rial control over real decision-making and the performance of the
involved firms. However, it is unclear whether these impacts tendto reduce or augment opportunistic behaviors of strategic alliance
managers.
Inter-firm relationships between the participants of alliances will
increase the complexity in management control because parent firms
are autonomous and they may have different expectations from the
alliances (Kamminga & Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007). Such differences
in expectationswhen coupledwith blurring boundaries of thefirm, as in
the case of CAs, createsmore incomplete or distorted disclosure of infor-
mation, i.e. managerial opportunism (Williamson, 1985). Opportunistic
activity by the managers in CA-firms in turn affects financial reporting
quality and lead to information asymmetry between the top manage-
ment and investors. Managerial opportunism also impacts accounting
method choices of alliance firms' managers (Watts & Zimmerman,
1986).
JV and CA portfolios signal the market the type of managers in
charge of the firm. Managers seek efficiency by searching cost reducing
investment activities to share risks with other firms. This way they gain
competitive advantage and reach several resources that they are not
able to do otherwise. However, strategic alliance investments may
cause managerial opportunism through business uncertainties, several
types of risks, legal costs, loss of a competitive advantage and loss of
reputation, and the lack of trust of partners for each other. Parent
firms of strategic alliances may monitor and take an active role in the
decision making process of their partners (Smith, 1996). Such cross
monitoring may decrease the abilities of the allied firm managers to
behave opportunistically hence influence disclosure choices.
Contractual and monitoring costs are minimized by equity sharing
(Williamson, 1985). JV-firms share equity ownership in the form of a
separate business entity; therefore, they have lower contractual and
monitoring costs in comparison to CA-firms. In other words formalized
equity ownership aligns incentives better in JVs relative to CAs. In CAs,
the absence of a separate economic entity due to blurring boundaries
Table 2
Two-digit industry classifications (SICs).
SIC code and industry description JV-firms CA-firms NA-firms JV&CA
01— Agricultural production-crops 15 17 167 5
02— Agricultural production-livestock 10 4 24 1
07— Agricultural services 12 6 27 0
08— Forestry 0 0 27 0
09— Fishing and hunting 0 8 22 0
10— Metal mining 82 34 815 23
12— Coal mining 0 7 46 0
13— Oil and gas extraction 128 172 2295 37
14— Manufacturing, non-materials 22 19 219 5
15— General building contractors 45 13 513 3
16— Heavy construction, 25 32 248 5
17— Special trade contractors 10 13 221 0
20— Food and kindred products 68 142 1550 38
21— Tobacco products 12 8 78 0
22— Textile mill products 27 27 356 8
23— Apparel and other textile products 23 103 594 8
24— Lumber and wood products 32 19 324 5
25— Furniture and fixtures 30 37 381 10
26— Paper and allied products 85 52 683 23
27— Printing and publishing 28 131 783 28
28— Chemical and allied products 202 723 4190 168
29— Petroleum and coal products 40 101 324 53
30— Rubber and miscellaneous plastic 43 62 656 13
31— Primary metal industries 8 47 205 8
32— Fabricated metal products 27 25 437 5
33— Industrial machinery/equipment 90 87 1018 28
34— Electronic and other equipment 40 43 948 0
35— Transportation equipment 133 636 3702 158
36— Instruments and related products 122 680 4650 180
37— Miscellaneous manufacturing 100 183 1276 98
38— Railroad transportation 85 493 3989 53
39— Misc. manufacturing Industries 17 95 705 13
40— Railroad transportation 18 25 162 0
41— Local and interurban passenger 0 5 46 3
42— Trucking and warehousing 6 23 510 8
44— Water transportation 18 8 248 3
45— Transportation by air 8 65 381 45
46— Pipelines, except natural gas 8 0 24 1
47— Transportation services 10 20 238 3
48— Communications 110 373 1923 258
49— Electric, gas, and sanitary services 191 143 2432 53
50— Wholesale trade— durable goods 55 133 1725 23
51— Wholesale trade— nondurable 33 100 896 15
52— Building materials and gardening 10 25 132 0
53— General merchandise stores 17 38 367 8
54— Food stores 15 35 402 20
55— Auto dealers and service stations 8 13 292 0
56— Apparel and accessory stores 17 13 621 0
57— Furniture and home furnishings 15 28 356 0
58— Eating and drinking places 30 58 1129 20
59— Miscellaneous retail 45 120 1272 15
60— Depositing Institutions 66 168 6334 53
61— No depositing credit institutions 22 73 797 25
62— Security & commodity brokers 45 53 851 28
63— Insurance carriers 62 75 1897 30
64— Insurance agents, brokers services 17 33 343 5
65— Real estate 30 48 788 20
67— Holding, other investment offices 146 145 2865 45
70— Hotels and other lodging places 45 23 302 8
72— Personal services 0 5 203 0
73— Business services 177 1863 1087 358
75— Auto repair, services, and parking 12 15 143 3
76— Misc. repair services 10 5 41 1
78— Motion pictures 33 88 464 20
79— Amusement and recreation 58 68 679 15
80— Health services 50 55 1032 13
81— Legal services 0 0 19 1
82— Educational services 0 5 243 0
83— Social services 10 0 176 0
86— Membership organizations 0 0 3 0
87— Engineering and management 45 108 1187 24
99— No classification establishment 23 63 810 23
Total number of observations 3026 8137 69,893 2123
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and gives rise to managerial opportunism. Moreover, as Table 1 sug-
gests, CA joint activity external disclosure levels are substantially
lower than JV joint activity disclosure levels. Opportunistic managers
are better able to exploit this lack of disclosure by the aggregated finan-
cial reports of parent firms.
4. Research design
4.1. Sample definition
Our analyses examine earnings quality for a sample offirms from the
years 1995 through 2007. We collected announcements of strategic
alliances from the Securities Data Company (SDC) Platinum database.
SDC gives several characteristics of alliances such as firms' identifiers
(CUSIP), their shares in the partnership, and partners' nationality. We
separated each firm from the alliance announcements, since firms are
collected under the same column for each alliance announcement. We
use the last three years from year t − 2 and t − 1 as well as through
year t to determine a firm's alliance status at year t. If a firm is not in-
volved in the formation of a JV or CA over this three-year time we
then classify that firm as a non-alliance (NA-firm). Alternatively, if a
firm is involved in the formation of one or more JV and CA at the same
time then we classify that firm as a JV&CA-firm. Firms involved solely
in the formation of joint ventures are classified as JV-firms while firms
involved solely in the formation of contractual alliances are classified
as CA-firms.
Table 2 documents the two-digit industry classification of strategic
alliance firms. The highest number of firm-year observations for CA-
firms is 1863 for business service industry and for JV-firms it is 202 for
chemical and allied industry.
Overall, there are 3026 JV-firms, 8137 CA-firms, 2123 JV&CA, and
69,893 NA-firm year observations in the sample. Sample sizes vary
according to availability of earnings quality metrics for a specific
analysis.
4.2. Earnings quality measures
There are a number of accounting related proxies used in the litera-
ture to measure the earnings potential of firms. Following Francis,
LaFond, and Schipper (2004), we divide our analyses based onwhether
a given proxy is purely accounting-based or whether it also incorpo-
rates equity market valuation properties market-based. The first one
consists of accounting-based earnings attributes that reflect on the fun-
damental informative properties of accounting earningsfigureswithout
reference to any specific user group. The latter includes attributes that
reflect the equity investors' sensitivity to the level of uncertainty and
informativeness in earnings.
4.2.1. Accounting-based earnings quality measures
We use five accounting based attributes: (1) earnings persistence,
(2) earnings smoothness, (3) accrual quality, (4) discretionary accrual,
and (5) absolute discretionary accrual.
4.2.1.1. Earnings persistence. The persistence measure captures earnings
sustainability and it is a desirable measure of quality because of its re-
curring characteristics (Francis et al., 2004; Velury & Jenkins, 2006).
Moreover, earnings persistence is positively associated with the capital
market responses to reported earnings due to the higher quality of earn-
ings (Kormendi & Lipe, 1987). FollowingAli and Zarowin (1992)we cal-
culate earnings persistence as the slope coefficient estimate from a first
order autoregressive model for annual split adjusted earnings per share
by using themaximum likelihood estimation and a rolling six-year win-
dow. This method yields a firm and year specific coefficient λ1 which
represents the PERSISTENCE of earnings for each firm at year t.
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close to zero represent transient earnings.
EPSj;t ¼ λ0; j þ λ1; jEPS j;t−1 þ error j;t ð1Þ
where EPS is earning per share that is equal to income before extraordi-
nary items, divided by the weighted average number of shares
outstanding.
We examine how PERSISTENCE varies across JV firms, CA firms and
NA firms, by estimating the following model:
PERSISTENCE ¼ α þ β1CAþ β2JV þ β3SIZE þ β4MBþ β5ROA
þ∑riINDUSTRYi þ∑riYEARþ error: ð2Þ
CA is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm
established a CA partnership, such as amarketing alliance, R&D alliance,
or licensing alliance in any of the last three years, the value is zero
otherwise. JV is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the
firm established a JV alliance in any of the last three years, and the
value of zero otherwise. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the market
value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year. MB is the market-to-
book ratio that is calculated by using themarket value of equity divided
by the book value of equity. ROA is the current year's return on assets
calculated as net income before extraordinary items divided by total
assets. INDUSTRY is a dummy variable for each two-digit industry
membership of each sample firm. YEAR is a dummy variable that takes
the value of one for that year, and zero otherwise for other years. We
adopt control variables from Lev (1983) which documents that earn-
ings persistence is associated with firm size and various industry char-
acteristics: type of products, degree of competition, and operating
leverage.
4.2.1.2. Smoothness. Smoothing is defined as reducing the variability of
reported earnings by altering the accounting component of earnings,
namely accruals (Leuz et al., 2003). Managers may opportunistically
smooth earnings to maximize benefits from bonus plans (Healy, 1985)
or to signal lower risk (Trueman & Titman, 1988). When earnings are
smoothed to mitigate the effects of transitory cash flows and adjust re-
ported earnings towards a more stable trend, then income smoothing
can enhance the value relevance of earnings (Subramanyam, 1996).
That is, smooth earnings constitute a desirable attribute by the capital
market. Instead, managers may smooth earnings to align expectations
with that of the market and even to increase their persistence (Hand,
1989).
We measure smoothness following Francis et al. (2004). Smooth-
ness is the ratio of standard deviation of net income before extraordi-
nary items divided by beginning total assets (NIBE), to its standard
deviation of cash flows from operations over the rolling six-year win-
dow method (CFO), scaled by beginning total assets as follows:





Larger values of Smoothness indicate less smooth earnings. We
estimate the following regression model to determine the difference
between CA-firms and NA-firms, and between JV-firms and NA-
firms:
SMOOTHNESS ¼ α þ β1CAþ β2JV þ β3SIZE þ β4MBþ β5ROA
þ∑riINDUSTRYi þ∑riYEARþ error:
ð4Þ
4.2.1.3. Accrual quality. Earnings that map closely into cash are more
desirable (Harris et al., 2000). Accrual quality is frequently used as a
proxy measure of the quality of earnings (Dechow & Dichev, 2002).
We use the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model as follows:
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debt in current liabilities of firm j's be-
tween year t − 1 and year t. DEPN
j,t
is depreciation and amortization
expense of firm j's in year t. We estimate Eq. (5) for each year using
rolling six-year windows. Accrual Quality (ACCQ) is equal to the stan-
dard deviation of firm j's estimated residuals from year t − 5 to year
t,σ(error
j,t
). Large values of ACCQ represent poor accrual quality as
well as poor earnings quality.
Following Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew (2003) we conduct an
empirical test by including JV and CA explanatory indicator variables
and replace discretionary accruals with ACCQ as the dependent variable.
ACCQ ¼ α þ β1CAþ β2JV þ β3SIZE þ β4MAþ β5FINANCINGþ β6LITIGATION
ð6Þ
whereMA is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm has
engaged in a merger and/or acquisition activity, and zero otherwise.
FINANCING is an indicator variable set equal to one if MA dummy is not
equal to one and the number of outstanding shares has increased by at
least 10%, or if long-term debts increased by at least 20%, or if the firm
first appears on the CRSP monthly returns database during the fiscal
year, zero otherwise. LITIGATION is a dummy variable that equals one if
the firm operates in the high litigation industries with the SIC codes of
2833–2836, 3570–3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, 7370–730, and zero
otherwise. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total assets at the begin-
ning of the fiscal period: total assets minus its book value divided by its
total assets. MB is the market-to-book ratio calculated as market value
of equity divided by book value of equity. LOSS is an indicator variable
that takes the value of one if thefirm reports a net loss for thefiscal period,
and zero otherwise. INSTSHARE is the percentage of shares held by institu-
tional investors reported in the Thomson financial database 13-f filings
section. All other variables are defined previously.
4.2.1.4. Discretionary accruals. A higher value of discretionary accrual
may signal a greater level of earnings management and lower earnings
quality (Dechow & Schrand, 2004), therefore accruals may be used op-
portunistically. We estimate the modified Jones model separately for
each year for each two-digit SIC code and compute performance adjust-
ed discretionary current accrual (PADCA) as the difference between the
abnormal accrual and the closest matched firm's abnormal accrual.
Closest matched firm is the firm in the same two-digit SIC code with
the closest ROA in the prior year (Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005).
We estimate Eq. (7) to examine the relationship between signed
PADCA and the firms' alliance strategies. We also use the ABSPADCA
(absolute value of PADCA) to capture both negative and positive
accruals as earnings management and earnings quality.
PADCA ¼ α þ β1CAþ β2JV þ β3L1ACCRUALþ β4SIZE þ β5MAþ β6FINANCING
þ β7LITIGATION þ β8LEVERAGEþ β9MBþ β10LOSSþ β11CFO
þ β12INSTSHAREþ β13ROAþ∑riINDUSTRYi þ∑riYEARi þ error
ð7Þ
ABSPADCA ¼ α þ β1CAþ β2JV þ β3ABSL1ACCRUALþ β4SIZEþ β5MAþ β6FINANCING
þ β7LITIGATION þ β8LEVERAGE þ β9MBþ β10LOSSþ β11CFO
þ β12INSTSHARE þ β13ROAþ∑riINDUSTRYi þ∑riYEARi þ error
ð8Þ
where L1ACCRUAL is equivalent to last year's total current accruals.
ABSL1ACCRUAL is the absolute value of LIACCRUAL. These variables are
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time. Other variables are as previously defined.
4.2.2. Marked-based earnings attributes
We have four measures that incorporate market-based impacts of
accounting information.
4.2.2.1. Value relevance. Value relevance is measured as the ability of
earnings to explain a variation in returnswhere the greater explanatory
power is desirable (Bushman, Chen, Engel, & Smith, 2004). A number of
studies interpret the value relevance of earnings as the direct measure
of usefulness of the financial reporting decisions (Francis et al., 2004).
We use the following regression specification for each firm over rolling
six-year windows. RELEVANCE is measured as the adjusted R-square of
the regression.
RET j;t ¼ ao; j þ a1; jEARN j;t þ a2; jΔEARNj;t þ error j;t ð9Þ
RETj,t firm j's 15-month compounded return ending three months
after the end of the fiscal year t; EARNj,t is firm j's income before extraor-
dinary items in year t (NIBE) scaled by market value at the end of year
t − 1; ΔEARNj,t is change in firm j's NIBE in year t scaled by market
value at the end of year t. Large (small) values of relevance measure
imply more (less) value relevance of earnings. We run the following
regression analysis to find the effects of the types of strategic alliances
on the RELEVANCE of earnings compared to NA firms:
RELEVANCE ¼ α þ β1CAþ β2JV þ β3SIZEþ β4MBþ β5ROA
þ∑riINDUSTRYi þ∑riYEARþ error: ð10Þ
4.2.2.2. Timeliness. Earnings timeliness measures the extent to which
current earnings captures the information set underlying the current
changes in stock price (Ball, Kothari, & Robin, 2000). Managers may
require timely information to determine how well their actions are
reflected in stock prices. Alternatively, managers may delay the disclo-
sure of private information because of their private rent seeking
incentives.
Bushman et al. (2004) document that ownership concentration, the
directors' and executives' equity based incentives, and outside directors'
reputations vary inverselywith earnings timeliness, and that ownership
concentration, and directors' equity based incentives increase with or-
ganizational complexity. Accordingly, we may expect less timeliness
in earnings for CA firms and JV firms. We calculate timeliness of earn-
ings by using a reverse regression setting for earnings as a dependent
variable and return as an independent variable.
EARNj;t ¼ ao; j þ a1; jNEGDUMj;t þ a2; jRET j;t þ a3; jNEGDUM x RET j;t þ error j;t
ð11Þ
whereNEGDUMj,t = 1 if RETj,t b 0, zero otherwise.We estimate Eq. (11)
by using the rolling six-year window method. Our measure of timeli-
ness is adjusted R2 in the above regression (Bushman et al., 2004). The
higher the value of timeliness measures, the higher the timeliness of
earnings. We employ the following regression analysis to document
the relationship between timeliness, JV, CA, and NA firms.
TIMELINESS ¼ α þ β1CAþ β2JV þ β3SIZE þ β4MBþ β5ROA
þ∑riINDUSTRYi þ∑riYEARþ error ð12Þ
4.2.2.3. Conservatism. Conservatism is defined as asymmetrical recogni-
tion of gains and losses. Conservatism is a desirable attribute of earnings
since it can be used to decrease information asymmetry by reducing
manager's ability to manipulate financial statements (Watts, 2003).
Conservatism is the ratio of the coefficient on bad news to the coeffi-
cient on good news which measures the difference in sensitivity ofnegative earnings in comparison to positive earnings (Francis et al.,
2004).
CONSERVATISM ¼ a2; j þ a3; j
 
=a2; j ð13Þ
The higher the value of this measure the more conservative is the
firm's earnings. We employ the following regression model to deter-
mine the earnings conservatism in alliancefirms compared to NA-firms.
CONSERVATISM ¼ α þ β1CAþ β2JV þ β3SIZE þ β4MBþ β5ROA
þ∑riINDUSTRYi þ∑riYEARþ error
ð14Þ
4.2.2.4. Earnings response coefficient (ERC). ERC confines the ability of
earnings to predict future cash flows more expansively. We expect
that ERC result would support our findings in the direction of the mar-
ket based earnings attributes. We build upon the Ali, Chen, and
Radhakrishnan (2007) model as follows:
CAR ¼ a0 þ a1ΔEPSþ a2CAþ a3ΔEPS CAþ a4JV þ a5SIZE þ a6MBþ a7BETA
þ a8ΔEPS JV þ a9ΔEPS SIZEþ a10ΔEPSMBþ a11ΔEPS BETA
þ∑riINDUSTRYi þ∑riINDUSTRYi  ΔEPSþ∑rtYEARt þ error ð15Þ
where CAR is the 12-month annually compounded size-adjusted abnor-
mal return beginning four months after the fiscal year end of year t − 1
and ending 3 months after the fiscal year end of year t;ΔEPS is the split-
adjusted annual change in earnings per share deflated by the price at
the beginning of the return accumulation period; BETA is the systematic
risk estimate obtained by regressing 60 monthly returns ending year
t − 2 on the CRSP equally weighted return index.
4.3. Voluntary disclosure
Companies may use voluntary management earnings guidance as a
complement to the financial statements when an accounting system is
less informative. Voluntary earning disclosure could be beneficial for in-
vestors to value the firm properly and may increase the market partici-
pants' confidence and knowledge about the firm. Therefore, voluntary
earning disclosure may be a substitute and as a remedy to decrease
the accounting information noise.
To examine the likelihood of management issuing quarterly earn-
ings forecasts across CA-firms and all otherfirms,we use quarterly earn-
ings guidance obtained from Thompson First Call Historical Database
(FCHD), Company IssuedGuidance (CIG)file. Ourmodel is the extended
form of Kasznik and Lev (1995)
Guidance=Forecast ¼ α þ β1CONTRACTUALþ β2ΔEPSþ β3JOINTVENTURE
þ β4SIZEþ β5BM þ β6HIGHTECH þ β7REGULATED
þ β8ROAþ β9BETAþ∑riINDUSTRYi þ∑rtYEARt þ error
ð16Þ
where TOTAL is a dummy that takes the value of one if the manager
makes an earnings forecast of quarterly earnings, zero otherwise. Essen-
tially TOTAL variable takes the value one if the total guidance given in a
year is bigger than one, zero otherwise. QUALITATIVE is the number of
qualitative forecasts in a year for a manager of a firm. QUANTITATIVE is
the number of quantitative forecasts in a year by the manager of a
firm. HIGHTECH is an indicator variable that takes on a value of one if
the firm operates in any of the following industries: Drugs (SIC codes
2833–286), Computers (3570–3577), Electronics (3600–3674), Pro-
gramming (7371–7379), R&D services (8731–8734), zero otherwise.
REGULATED is an indicator variable that takes on a value of one if the
firm operates in any of the following industries: Telephone (SIC Codes
4812–4813), TV (4833), Cable (4841), Communications (4811–4899),
Gas (4922–4924), Electricity (4931), Water (4941), Financial Firms
(6021–6023, 6035–6036, 6141, 6311, 6321, 6331), zero otherwise. All
other variables are as defined previously.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics (year 1997–2007).
Panel A: control variables
Variables Mean values Mean difference test
JV only CA only NA only JV&CA CA-NA JV-NA JV-CA
SIZE 5.023 4.869 4.759 4.956 0.110⁎⁎⁎ 0.264⁎⁎⁎ 0.154⁎⁎
MB 3.763 5.137 4.534 4.675 0.603 −0.771 −1.374
ROA −0.028 −0.156 −0.199 −0.101 0.043⁎⁎⁎ 0.171⁎⁎⁎ 0.128⁎⁎
No. of observations 3026 8137 69,893 2123
L1ACCRUAL (%) 2.267 2.372 2.027 2.278 0.345⁎ 0.240 −0.105⁎
ABSL1ACCRUAL(%) 5.673 6.764 6.875 6.176 −0.111⁎⁎ −1.202⁎⁎ −1.091⁎⁎
MA 0.475 0.378 0.329 0.452 0.049⁎⁎⁎ 0.146⁎⁎⁎ 0.097⁎⁎
FINANCING 0.179 0.201 0.192 0.198 0.009⁎ −0.013⁎⁎⁎ −0.022⁎
LITIGATION 0.138 0.298 0.241 0.264 0.057⁎⁎ −0.103⁎⁎⁎ −0.160⁎⁎
LEVERAGE 0.429 0.365 0.538 0.408 −0.173⁎⁎⁎ −0.109⁎⁎⁎ 0.064⁎⁎⁎
LOSS 0.278 0.301 0.219 0.280 0.082⁎⁎ 0.059⁎⁎⁎ −0.023⁎⁎⁎
CFO 0.042 0.002 0.063 0.031 −0.061⁎⁎ −0.021⁎⁎ 0.040⁎⁎⁎
INSTSHARE 0.345 0.284 0.321 0.315 −0.037⁎⁎⁎ 0.024⁎⁎⁎ 0.061⁎⁎⁎
No. of observations 2876 7963 62,744 1974
Panel B: accounting and market based earning attributes dependent variables (JV-only)
Variables JV-firms mean CA-firms Mean NA-firms mean JV&CA mean CA-NA mean JV-NA mean JV-CA mean
Accounting based measures
PERSISTENCE 0.278 0.127 0.275 0.198 −0.148⁎⁎⁎ 0.003 0.151⁎⁎
SMOOTHNESS 0.798 0.976 0.751 0.834 0.225⁎⁎ 0.047⁎⁎ −0.178⁎⁎⁎
ACCQ 0.101 0.153 0.098 0.112 0.055⁎⁎ 0.003 −0.052⁎⁎⁎
PADCA (%) −0.423 −0.561 0.203 −0.473 −0.764⁎⁎⁎ −0.626 0.138⁎⁎⁎
ABSPADCA 6.543 8.765 8.021 7.327 0.744⁎⁎⁎ −1.478⁎⁎⁎ −2.222⁎⁎
Hotelling T2 for accounting based measures 236⁎⁎⁎ 11.35 172⁎⁎⁎
Market based measures
RELEVANCE 0.307 0.221 0.398 0.276 −0.177⁎⁎ −0.091⁎⁎⁎ 0.086⁎⁎⁎
TIMELINESS 0.376 0.278 0.412 0.305 −0.134⁎⁎⁎ −0.036 0.098⁎⁎
CONSERVATISM 0.542 0.437 0.592 0.501 −0.155⁎⁎⁎ −0.050⁎ 0.105⁎⁎⁎
No. of observations 2876 7963 62,744 1974
Hotelling T2 for market based measures 198⁎⁎⁎ 14.91 163⁎⁎⁎
Hotelling T2 for all measures 372⁎⁎⁎ 37.72⁎⁎ 201⁎⁎⁎
Hotelling T2 are calculated by following Hotelling (1947).
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.10.
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5.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics. As amatter of descriptive inter-
est means in this table are provided based on whether a firm-year is
classified as JV-only, CA-only, NA, or JV&CA. In the analyses that follow
JV&CA, firm years are not broken out as a separate category. Moreover,
exclusion of this subset of firm years from the analysis does not change
the reported results in any substantive fashion.
Initial sample comprises of 3026 JV-firm, 8137 CA-firm, 69,893
NA-firm, and 2123 JV&CA-firm-year observations for which SIZE,
MB and ROA data are available. In general, JV-firms are larger (SIZE)
and more profitable (ROA) than CA-firm and NA-firms. CA-firms are
larger in size than NA-firms are as well. Furthermore, CA-firms have
lower ROA than both JV-firms and NA-firms. Panel A also presents
means for the other control variables used in the various earnings qual-
ity analyses for a somewhat smaller sample of firm-year observations
where the sample reduction is dictated by data availability. In general,
with the exception of L1ACCRUAL, these means (medians) differ signif-
icantly at conventional levels across the three groups (JV-firm, CA-firm,
and NA-firm). Therefore, it is important to control for them (as appro-
priate) in identifying differences in earnings quality across these three
groups accurately.
Panel B of Table 3 provides information on themean values for firm-
specific earnings attribute variables. We do not report values for ERCbecause we evaluate ERC variation by means of cross-sectional regres-
sions. According to the Hotelling T2 statistics the CA-firm mean vector
differs significantly from either JV-firm or NA-firm mean vector. How-
ever, the JV-firm mean vector is indistinguishable from the NA-firm
mean vector for these measures. The accounting-based, market-based
and the combined set of mean vector measures differ from one another,
although the achieved significance levels are substantially higher for
comparisons involving the CA-firm mean vector. Taken individually,
mean comparisons in this table reveal that CA-firms have less PERSIS-
TENT and less SMOOTH earnings than NA-firms. In terms of the three
market-based measures, CA-firms have less RELEVANT, less TIMELY,
and less CONSERVATIVE earnings than NA-firms. With the possible ex-
ception of the income-increasing accruals, all of these effects are consis-
tent with the notion that CA-firms have lower quality earnings than NA
firms. In contrast, JV-firms are indistinguishable fromNA-firms in terms
of PERSISTANCE and SMOOTHNESS of earnings, and ACCQ, and have
lower ABSPADCA than NA-firms. However, similar to CA-firms they
also have less RELEVANT earnings than NA-firms.
5.2. Accounting-based earnings quality analysis
Table 4 reports independent variable coefficient estimates and asso-
ciated t-statistics for the five accounting based earnings quality
measures.
These results suggest that CA involvement is associated with deteri-
oration in the financial reporting environment. Specifically, earnings of
Table 4
Alliance firms and accounting based metric regressions (Year = 1997–2007 N = 73,583).
Model 1a (b): PERSISTENCE (SMOOTHNESS) = α + β1CA + β2JV + β3SIZE + β4 MB + β5ROA + ∑ri INDUSTRYi + ∑ri YEAR + error
Model 2: ACCQ (PADCA, ABSPADCA) = α + β1CA + β2JV + β3SIZE + β4
MB + β5ROA + β6MA + β7FINANCING + β8LITIGATION + β9LEVERAGE + β10LOSS + β11INSTSHARE + ∑ri INDUSTRYi + ∑rt YEARt + error
Model 3a(b): PADCA (ABSPADCA) = α + β1CA + β2JV + β3SIZE + β4 MB + β5ROA + β6MA + β7FINANCING + β8LITIGATION + β9LEVERAGE + β10LOSS + β11INSTSHARE + β11CFO
+ β11L1ACCRUAL(ABSL1ACCRUAL) + ∑ri INDUSTRYi + ∑rt YEARt + error
Independent variables Model 1a Model 1b Model 2 Model 3a Model 3b
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
CA −0.346 −3.28⁎⁎ 0.371 4.71⁎⁎⁎ 0.114 3.87⁎⁎⁎ −0.012 −2.13⁎⁎ 0.018 4.21⁎⁎⁎
JV −0.001 −1.04 0.018 1.17 0.045 1.79⁎ −0.002 −0.75 0.002 1.02
SIZE 0.032 2.21⁎⁎ −0.089 −3.27⁎⁎⁎ −0.034 −2.19⁎⁎ 0.021 2.49⁎⁎ −0.028 −4.56⁎⁎⁎
MB −0.002 −4.38⁎⁎⁎ −0.001 −2.07⁎⁎ 0.141 2.76⁎⁎⁎ −0.000 −0.69 −0.000 −0.56
ROA 0.075 1.87⁎ −0.028 −1.65⁎ −0.254 −2.08⁎⁎ 0.101 2.01⁎⁎ 0.024 1.27
MA 0.153 1.61 0.012 3.78⁎⁎⁎ 0.104 3.18⁎⁎⁎
FINANCING 0.023 1.89⁎ 0.367 1.65⁎ 0.301 1.47
LITIGATION 0.002 2.46⁎⁎ −0.113 −0.93 0.019 2.27⁎⁎
LEVERAGE −0.108 −1.92⁎ −0.176 −1.42 0.017 3.07⁎⁎⁎
LOSS 0.179 1.05 −0.021 −1.76⁎ −0.005 −1.07
INSTSHARE −0.139 −2.52⁎⁎ −0.017 −1.87⁎ 0.023 0.79
CFO −0.045 −2.27⁎⁎ −0.043 −2.79⁎⁎⁎
L1ACCRUAL 0.187 0.65
ABSL1ACCRUAL 0.203 2.66⁎⁎⁎
Adjusted R2 (%) 2.79 3.87 25.41 5.01 10.98
No. of observations 73,583 73,583 73,583 73,583 73,583
No. of clusters 13,042 13,042 13,042 13,042 13,042
H0: CA = JV (t-stat) 2.86⁎⁎⁎ 4.31⁎⁎⁎ 4.06⁎⁎⁎ 2.72⁎⁎⁎ 5.61⁎⁎⁎
The t-statistics are corrected using the Huber–White procedure by following Petersen (2009).
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.10.
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tion CA coefficient is negative and significant (.01 level). This finding in-
dicates that earnings of CA-firms are not sustainable, not recurring and
are noisy which are not desirable for investors. SMOOTHNESS regression
documents that CA coefficient is positive (significant at the .01) show-
ing that CA-firms have less smooth earnings which is open to transitory
fluctuations than those of NA firms. Therefore, CA firms' earnings are
noisy and less representative of their operations. Accrual quality is
also lower for CA-firms as the CA coefficient in theACCQ equation is pos-
itive and highly significant (.01 level) that indicates that earnings of CA-
firms do not map closely into cash. Lower ACCQwould be indication of
higher cost of debt and equity for CA-firms (Francis et al., 2005).Table 5
Alliance firms and marked based metric regressions (Year 1997–2007 N = 73,583).
Model 1: RELEVANCE = α + β1CA + β2JV + β3SIZE + β4 MB + β5ROA + ∑ri INDUSTRYi +
Model 2: TIMELINESS = α + β1CA + β2JV + β3SIZE + β4 MB + β5ROA + ∑ri INDUSTRYi +
Model 3: CONSERVATISM = α + β1CA + β2JV + β3SIZE + β4 MB + β5ROA + ∑ri INDUST







Adjusted R2 (%) 4.27
No. of observations 73,583
No. of clusters 13,042
H0: CA = JV (t-stat) 4.27⁎⁎⁎
The t-statistics are corrected using the Huber–White procedure by following Petersen (2009).
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.10.While PADCA for CA-firms are marginally smaller (significant at the
.05 level) than those of NA firms, the ABSPADCA analysis reveals that ab-
solute variation in PADCA is greater for CA-firms (significant at the .01
level). Hence, CA is associatedwith a greater usage of accruals tomanip-
ulate income on a period-by-period basis. CA-firms use income-
decreasing PADCA to avoid political cost, but that possibility is low for
those firms because they have lower profitability ratio than both JV-
firms and NA-firms.
JV firms are generally indistinguishable from NA firms in terms
of the set of accounting based earnings quality metrics. JV-firms dif-
fer from NA-firms only with respect to ACCQ at the .10 level. This
would suggest that involvement in a JV is associated with lower∑ri YEAR + error
∑ri YEAR + error
RYi + ∑ri YEAR + error
Model 2 Model 3
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
−0.203 −5.08⁎⁎⁎ −0.375 −3.89⁎⁎⁎
0.176 1.88⁎ 0.078 1.18
0.159 2.47⁎⁎ −0.176 −2.87⁎⁎⁎
0.054 0.98 0.048 2.09⁎⁎






Alliance firms and earning response coefficient (ERC) (Year 1997–2007 N = 26,877).
Model: CAR = a0+ a1ΔEPS + a2CA + a3 ΔEPS × CA + a4JV + a5SIZE + a6 MB + a7BETA + a8ΔEPS × JV + a9ΔEPS × SIZE + a10ΔEPS × MB + a11ΔEPS × BETA + ∑ri INDUSTRYi
+ ∑ri INDUSTRYi × ΔEPS + ∑rt YEARt + error
Panel A: descriptive statistics
Variables Mean Mean difference tests
JV only CA only NA only JV&CA CA-NA JV-NA JV-CA
CAR 0.023 0.009 0.028 0.021 −0.019⁎⁎ −0.005⁎ 0.014
ΔEPS 0.019 0.013 0.023 0.016 −0.010⁎⁎ −0.004 0.006
SIZE 5.243 4.974 4.875 5.072 0.099⁎⁎⁎ 0.368⁎⁎⁎ 0.269
MB 3.247 4.321 4.265 4.643 0.056⁎⁎⁎ −1.018⁎⁎⁎ −1.074⁎⁎⁎
BETA 0.902 1.108 0.878 1.054 0.230⁎⁎⁎ 0.024 −0.206⁎⁎⁎
No. of Obs. 1256 2578 22,056 987
Panel B: regression estimates
Independent variables Model
Predicted sign Coeff. t-stat
ΔEPS + 0.329 4.03⁎⁎⁎
CA ? −0.023 −2.21⁎⁎
ΔEPS × CA ? −0.087 −2.78⁎⁎⁎
JV ? −0.018 −1.54
SIZE + −0.157 −4.71⁎⁎⁎
MB − −0.042 −2.01⁎⁎
BETA + 0.047 3.05⁎⁎⁎
ΔEPS × JV ? −0.006 −2.27⁎⁎
ΔEPS × SIZE + 0.060 1.87⁎
ΔEPS × MB + 0.035 3.42⁎⁎⁎
ΔEPS × BETA − 0.024 1.18
Adjusted R2 (%) 6.78
No. of observations 26,877
No. of clusters 3979
H0: CA = JV (t-stat) 3.04⁎⁎⁎
H0: ΔEPS × CA = ΔEPS × JV (t-stat) 4.16⁎⁎⁎
The t-statistics are corrected using the Huber–White procedure.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.10.
Table 7
Descriptive statistics of alliance firms and voluntary management guidance (Year 1997–2007 N = 73,583).
Model: Guidance = α + β1 CONTRACTUAL + β2ΔEPS + β3JOINTVENTURE + β4SIZE + β5BM + β6 HIGHTECH + β7REGULATED + β8 ROA + Β9 BETA + ∑ri INDUSTRYi + ∑rt
YEARt + error
Panel A: descriptive statistics
Variables Mean difference test Median difference test
CA Others CA-others CA Others CA-others
TOTAL 0.384 0.208 0.176⁎⁎⁎ 0.000 0.000 0.000⁎⁎⁎
QUALITATIVE 0.268 0.103 0.165⁎⁎⁎ 0.000 0.000 0.000⁎⁎⁎
QUANTITATIVE 0.715 0.353 0.362⁎⁎⁎ 0.000 0.000 0.000⁎⁎⁎
HIGHTECH 0.407 0.164 0.243⁎⁎⁎ 0.000 0.000 0.000⁎⁎⁎
REGULATED 0.066 0.104 −0.038⁎⁎⁎ 0.000 0.000 0.000⁎⁎⁎
No. of observations 7963 65,620 7963 65,620
Panel B: logistic model estimates for total forecast
Variables TOTAL forecast QUALITATIVE forecast QUANTITATIVE
Odds ratio Robust SE Z Odds ratio Robust SE Z Odds ratio Robust SE Z
CONTRACTUAL 1.228 0.067 3.75⁎⁎⁎ 1.229 0.080 3.16⁎⁎⁎ 1.089 0.048 1.93⁎
ΔEPS 1.021 0.020 1.06 1.032 0.041 0.80 1.022 0.021 1.08
JOINTVENTURE 0.864 0.074 −1.71⁎ 1.090 0.091 1.04 0.840 0.052 −2.83⁎⁎⁎
SIZE 1.477 0.019 9.12⁎⁎⁎ 1.408 0.018 6.16⁎⁎⁎ 1.484 0.014 8.71⁎⁎⁎
BM 1.092 0.029 3.24⁎⁎⁎ 1.157 0.041 4.10⁎⁎⁎ 1.096 0.028 3.64⁎⁎⁎
HIGHTECH 1.027 0.082 0.34 1.111 0.092 1.27 0.886 0.049 −2.18⁎⁎
REGULATED 0.901 0.140 −0.67 0.832 0.153 −1.00 0.702 0.092 −2.69⁎⁎⁎
ROA 1.819 0.177 6.14⁎⁎⁎ 1.080 0.127 0.66⁎⁎⁎ 2.187 0.205 8.36⁎⁎⁎
BETA 0.998 0.002 −0.94 0.999 0.001 −0.48 1.002 0.002 0.77
Pseudo R2 (%) 16.23 10.37 10.37
No. of observations 73,583 73,583 73,583
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.10.
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ferent from CA firms' dummy coefficients at 1% level at PERSISTENCE
of earnings, SMOOTHNESS of earnings, ACCQ, PADCA, and ABSPADCA
with the t-stats of 2.86, 4.31, 4.06, 2.72 and 5.61 respectively. These
findings support the idea that JV-firms and CA-firms have different
earnings quality characteristics.
5.3. Market-based earnings quality analysis
Table 5 reports estimates of market valuation of earnings
information.
In terms of RELEVANCE, the CA coefficient is negative and significant
at the .01 level, indicating that CA-firm earnings are typically less rele-
vant for market valuation than the earnings of NA-firms (Lev &
Zarowin, 1999). CA-firms also have less TIMELY and less CONSERVATIVE
accounting earnings numbers than NA-firms. In each equation, the CA
coefficient is negative and significant at the .01 level or better. In con-
trast, the JV coefficient is negative in the RELEVANCE analysis (not signif-
icant at the conventional level), but is positive in the TIMELINESS
(significant at the .10 level) and CONSERVATISM analyses. The conserva-
tism result can also be indicative of a heightened level of information
asymmetry in CA-firms (Lafond & Watts, 2007). Following Ball et al.'s
(2000) argument about conservatism and timeliness our combined re-
sults specifically indicate that earnings of CA-firms may not measure
economic income and their income maybe less transparent. Hence, in-
volvement in a CA is associated with a decline in earnings RELEVANCE,
TIMELINESS and CONSERVATISM but this does not hold true for JV-
firms. T-values that test whether the coefficients on CA dummies differ
from those of JV dummies are 4.27, 5.34, and 3.81 for RELEVANCE, TIME-
LINESS and CONSERVATISM respectively. T-stats have p-values smaller
than 0.01 which is a strong support of informational differences.
Table 6 reports the earnings response coefficient analysis. The ERC
effect of CA and JV firms is measured as a conditional effect in a cross-
sectional analysis where abnormal market return is the dependent var-
iable. Descriptive results in panel A show that CA-firms have lower un-
expected returns, and EPS changes, but higher Betas than do NA-firms
(all differences are significant at the .05 level or better). CA-firms also
appear to have lower unexpected returns than JV-firms (difference is
significant at the .10 level).
Panel B of Table 6 reports the main ERC equation estimates. Both CA
and the interaction between CA andΔEPS are negative and significant at
the .05 and .01 levels respectively. Hence, controlling for other factors,
CA involvement is associated with lower returns and a lower ERC rela-
tive to NA-firms. Interestingly, this ERC effect is repeated for JV-firms.
That is, JV involvements for firm is also associated with lower returns
and lower ERC but not as high as CA-firms. CA and JV (ΔEPS × CA and
ΔEPS × JV) coefficients are significantly different from each other at
1% level with the t-value 3.04 (4.16) indicating that investors respond
differently for CA-firms and JV-firms with different discount levels of
26.44% and 5.47% respectively in comparison to NA-firms.
5.4. Voluntary disclosure
Table 7 Panel A documents descriptive statistics of number of volun-
tary earnings management guidance for all firms. CA-firms on average
(median) give more total number of earnings forecast, qualitative and
quantitative guidance than other firms at the 1% level. This result is con-
sistent with our prediction about providing remedial management
guidance, and warnings. These univariate results may indicate man-
agers' good intentions and efforts to inform the investors in the case
of low information quality environments where accounting numbers
are not useful and reliable.
We report LOGIT model regression results in Panel B of Table 7.
Being CA-firm increases the likelihood of providing earning guidance
by 22.8%, which is significant at the 1% level. This is consistent with
the argument that firms increase earnings guidance to avoid legal,political and reputation costs (Kasznik & Lev, 1995). Existence of CAs in-
creases qualitative number of forecasts 22.9%. The likelihood of a quan-
titative forecast increases in all samples with the existence of CAs by 8.9
which is significant at 10% level.
These multivariate results are also consistent with our prediction of
managers' remedial guidance in the case of low reporting quality and
when accounting numbers are not useful. Managers may not be strate-
gic about voluntary disclosures; instead they may try to decrease the
effects of a noisy information environment because of the existence of
CAs within their organizations.
6. Contributions and limitations
We investigate and identify earning quality differences among firms
involved in strategic alliances (either CA or JV firm) relative to those
firms which are not involved in any alliances. We also look into the dif-
ferences between JV-firm and CA-firms' earnings qualities to explore
their differential consequences. This latter comparison is of particular
interest since JV and CA firms are involved in similar types of activities,
but they differ in formality of the arrangement and the amount of the fi-
nancial information reported about the joint activity. Hence, differences
between them more clearly pertain to the differential aspects of the
strategic alliance form.
We contribute to the literature by showing that despite the exis-
tence of more voluntary disclosure of the CA-firms in hopes to give
more reliable data about the financial status of the firm, still CA-firms
possess a different earnings quality from JV-firms and NA-firms. Our
contributions are significant in actually showing that when the bound-
aries of the firm are blurred financial reporting quality is adversely af-
fected. In other words, although CA-firms provide more quantitative
and qualitative number of voluntary disclosures than JV and NA firms
in order to give more reliable data to investors, still defining clear
boundaries for the alliance matters. Moreover, when organizations set
up a separate organizational unit with clear boundaries, as in the case
of the JV-firms, their accounting quality may not deteriorate because
of well-defined accounting systems.
Our paper alsomakes a contribution to the incomplete contract liter-
ature which has devoted a significant amount of attention to the ineffi-
ciencies generated by incomplete contracts (Aghion & Tirole, 1997; Hart
& Moore, 1990). We provide strong evidence that incomplete contracts
such as in the case of CA-firms generate inefficiencies in accounting, be-
cause CAs are associated with greater noise in their accounting and
lower accounting quality. Our findings can be valuable to practitioners
and regulators in designing accounting guidelines for firms engaging
in contractual alliances.
Our findings suggests that the unstructured reporting and
contracting setting of CAs is associated with declines in reporting qual-
ity across a number of dimensions. Alternatively, on most dimensions,
JVs are indistinguishable from firms that are comparatively uninvolved
in CAs. This dissimilarity suggests that the separate business entity
structure of JVs mitigates the reporting quality impacts of the interde-
pendencies stemming from strategic alliances.
There are some limitations in our study which are important to con-
sider when interpreting our analysis. The significant hurdle facing our
analysis is the general unavailability of either structure or specific finan-
cial measures of CA activities. Indeed, the absence of such structures and
measures is a likely source of the effectswe observe. Hence,we lack clar-
ity regarding how CA involvement compromises reported accounting
numbers. Another concern is the existence of omitted variables that
may be driving the reporting effects, as well as the underlying choice
to become involved in a strategic alliance. That is, the associations doc-
umented arise as consequences from factors drivingfirms to become in-
volved in strategic alliances. The existence of this endogeneity problem
would be difficult to disentangle completely. Interestingly, however, our
descriptive analysis of JV and CA financial reports suggests that they
encompass similar sorts of activities and share similar underlying
1816 S. Demirkan, I. Demirkan / Journal of Business Research 67 (2014) 1806–1816motivations. The differences we document arise largely with CA-firms,
not JV-firms. That is, within the subset of firms choosing to become in-
volved in strategic alliances it is only the CA form that is characterized
by widespread adverse earnings attribute consequences.
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